Although King Matthias is a very popular figure in our historical memory, it was surprising during his reign that there were perhaps the most conspiracies to overthrow the crowned king in Hungary. In 1467, Transylvania rebelled against him – mainly over the introduction of new types of taxation – and this rebellion was supported by the Moldavian Voivode Stephen (Bogdanovich) III (the Great), through whom the Polish-Lithuanian ruler Casimir IV pulled the strings.
At this time, the now legendary Polish-Hungarian friendship was on the point of breaking down, as the Polish Jagello dynasty also laid claim to the throne of Matthias Hunyadi. In addition, Moldavia wedged between the two great powers, was also a source of problems, with both kingdoms demanding vassalage from it.
In August 1467, Matthias invaded Transylvania from Buda with an army of 12,000 men, where he quickly dispersed the rebel forces allied against him and began to retaliate. Some were pardoned, some Hungarian lords escaped with the loss of some of their estates, but others were torn apart by the king with fiery pincers in the center of Brassó (Brasov, Kronstadt). The pacification was swift, and soon he was a merciful ruler who forgave rebellious towns like his native Kolozsvár.
After the suppression of the Transylvanian rebellion, King Matthias Corvinus, even though it was already late autumn, decided to attack the Moldavian governor Stephen Bogdanovich, who not only incited the Transylvanian Wallachians but also, having driven out Peter Aaron, who had recognized Hungarian sovereignty in 1458, he replaced him as prince and immediately afterward paid homage to the Polish king Casimir.
Voivode Szapolyai Imre of Transylvania warned the king not to expose his army to the great fatigue of crossing the Carpathians in the coming harsh winter weather, but Matthias refused to give in, saying that this was the best time, because Bogdanovich did not even suspect that he would be attacked even at this time. Thereupon the annoyed Voivode retreated with his troops to his land, not heeding the summons of the Archbishop Vitéz, who had been sent after him.
According to some, Matthias left Szeben (Sibiu) with the rest of his forces (with Székely and Saxon soldiers joining him) at the end of October, other troops set out on 25 November, accompanied by Ország Mihály, Csupor Miklós, Pongrácz János, Báthori István, Bánfi Miklós and Czezinge János, Bishop of Pécs. There is no doubt that he advanced with a large army by medieval standards, and the previously ousted Moldavian Voivode Peter went with him.
To his surprise, he found the Ojtoz and Gyimes straits blocked and occupied by Polish mercenaries. But this did not change his plans much, he had the forts burned down, and the Polish mercenaries pushed back. Matthias first took the town of Tatros, which he burned, and then slowly pushed north along the river Szeret, parallel to the Carpathian Mountains. Voivode Stephen, with his suddenly assembled troops, followed the outnumbering Hungarians only cautiously and was forced to watch as they destroyed Bákó, Románvásár, and then Karácsonykő.
Matthias seemed to be heading for Szucsáva, the capital. In his letter to the King of Poland, Voivode Stephen wrote that for 40 days and 40 nights, he had been in pursuit by the Hungarians, who had ravaged his country more savagely than the Turks or the Tartars had done before. On the evening of 13 December, the Hungarian army camped at Moldvabánya, and even Voivode Stephen wrote the name of the place as Bánya in his Latin letter, as it was inhabited by a large Hungarian community at that time.
The Moldavian voivode had already made a peace offer at the town of Roman (Románvásár), but Matthias, seeing that the offer was not sincere, continued his advance and soon reached Bogdanovich, who, however, not trusting his soldiers, refused to fight and continued his retreat, as a result of which the Hungarian army reached Moldvabánya and Baja without any obstacles, where he camped for a longer rest. Here the Voivode again made his peace offer, promising the recognition of the Hungarian high command, but also secretly making preparations for a surprise for the Hungarians at night.
Mátyás stayed in the bishop’s residence in the main square. The army was secured by Székely troops from four directions, but some of the soldiers started to drink wine, not expecting a fight. The army of Voivode Stephen was camped in a nearby forest and planned to surprise the Hungarians with a sudden attack at night. The surprise was successful.
According to Bonfini’s chronicle, Matthias was warned by a Hungarian about the approaching 12,000 Vlachs when he was having dinner but there was no time to get the soldiers, who had begun to drink in some places, properly lined up. The infantry, under the command of Ország Mihály, Csupor Miklós, and Pongrácz János, the Transylvanian voivodes, and Báthori István, was stationed in the great square of the city; 200 iron-clad bodyguards of the king under Bánfi Miklós remained near the king, while the greater part of the cavalry was stationed in several groups on the streets of the city, and only a smaller part was stationed outside the city, to observe and report the enemy’s approach.
The residents of the town sided with the Moldavians and set some of the buildings on fire: it was the signal to Stephen’s men to launch the attack. The Moldavian and Polish attack, which began at around 2 a.m. on the 14th, and swept away the heroically fighting Székelys, whose Comes was killed in action. The voivode’s men got as close as Matthias, who gathered his heavy cavalry in the square and engaged in battle himself with 200 bodyguards.
Matthias took part in the meleé, and he was wounded by an arrow in his back and received two more injuries as well. When he tried to pluck the arrow out, the bearded mountain broke in the wound, and only in 1471, after four years of suffering, was the king freed of it. In any case, the Moldavian assault was broken by armored cavalry and the slowly recovering Czech-Moravian mercenaries under Giskra, and the attackers were driven off by dawn on 15 December, after a 4-hour-long bloody fight.
After a great effort, the enemy was finally driven out of the city, which then retreated to a suitable distance, abandoning further attack and fighting. Daróczi János (also known as Drach Berchthold), the king’s courtier, was left dead on the battlefield with several noblemen. Bonfinius puts the Hungarian losses at 1200, and Sigler puts the Moldavian losses at 7000.
The earlier almost universal statement that the Moldavians won the battle is an interesting view, if only because the sources clearly show that the Hungarian forces remained in control of the battlefield, collecting their wounded, burying their dead, and collecting the rich spoils. This included, of course, the plundering of the corpses, since archaeologists very rarely find weapons or armor of great value in battlefield graves. The night battle was a great loss for both sides, as it was not a classic orderly battle between the houses of the burning city, and could not be controlled.
The wounded king decided not to continue his campaign (if that was his original intention), but led his army home to Transylvania 3 days later. This undoubtedly allowed Stephen III to claim the battle as a victory, and he sent some of the Hungarian banners captured during the battle to the Polish king as proof. Interestingly, thanks to a letter by Janus Pannonius, we know for a fact that the Hungarian army also captured 14 Moldavian flags, which were then displayed by Matthias in the Church of Our Lady in Buda (now better known as the Church of Matthias).
The Hungarian troops marching across the snowy Carpathians burned their equipment and wagons, which were difficult to get across the pass and of lesser value, buried some of their cannons, and then marched to Székely Land. The Moldavian army captured some of these. Mátyás undoubtedly missed the target, but the battle was won by the Hungarians, who gained considerable booty and destroyed Moldavian strongholds along the border. Also, we don’t have information that the Voivode was pursuing the Hungarians.
Matthias spent the Christmas holidays and the New Year in Brassó. Then he moved to Kolozsvár, where he also stayed for a longer period, already occupied with the idea of a new Moldavian campaign, because he did not want to return to his capital until he had cleared the damage he had done to his own and the nation’s reputation. In the second half of January 1468, he called a national council to discuss the preparations at Várad, but the campaign came to nothing, because the Moldavian Voivode sent an embassy to Matthias asking for mercy and announcing his submission, and Matthias agreed to the agreement.
All in all, the result was a draw, but Voivode Stephen had to realize that Matthias could be of much greater help to him in the fight against the Turks than the Polish king. On the way to Buda, on 10 February, Archbishop Vitéz appeared before the king at Nádudvar with the repentant Szapolyai Imre, whom the king also forgave.
(Source: Bánlaky József and Horváth Gábor)
The legacy of the battle
- The first interpretation:
Some Romanian historians claim that the Battle of Moldvabánya (Baia) was a great victory of the Voivode of Moldavia, Stephen the Great (Stefan cel Mare) against the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus. But was it a Hungarian defeat?
The battle was part of Mátyás’s campaign against Moldavia, who wanted to punish Stephen’s involvement in a revolt against him in Transylvania. During the campaign, the Hungarians took the main cities and castles of Moldavia (Bákó, Románvásár, etc.). Stephen applied the tactic of scorched earth against his troops and avoided any open confrontation. Mátyás’s troops then camped at Moldvabánya (Baia) from Moldova, then inhabited by Hungarians and Saxons.
The battle occurred on the night of December 14-15, 1467. The Moldavian troops of Stephen the Great, reinforced by Polish mercenaries, launched a surprise attack against the Hungarian forces camped in the city of Moldvabánya. At the outset, the Moldovans enjoyed initial success, breaching the Hungarian camp and pushing back the Hungarians. However, Mátyás swiftly reorganized his troops, particularly his heavy cavalry, and subsequently routed the Moldovans.
Some sources indicate that Stephen was initially captured, but subsequently released after offering a bribe to his captors. As a consequence of the Hungarian counterattack, the Moldovians retreated in disorder, losing numerous flags. These were subsequently presented at Buda after the conclusion of the campaign. The Hungarian poet Janus Pannonius composed a poem commemorating the military trophies captured by the Hungarians in the battle. However, it is noteworthy that the Moldavians also captured some Hungarian flags during the initial stages of the battle.
It is therefore pertinent to question how some have asserted that Stephen won the battle. Following the established principles of warfare, the winner of a fight is determined by who owns the battlefield after the end of the battle. The battlefield remained under the control of Matthias. So, this resolves the question of the winner of the fight. After the battle, Matthias retreated to Transylvania, as he had been wounded by arrows and a spear. His life could only be saved by the medics from Brassó. However, his retreat was solely a result of his wounds and not due to the success of Stephen.
For those who speak Romanian, a video of a Romanian historian discussing the battle can be found here:
This Romanian historian shows that the conflict did not result in a triumph for the Moldavians. Matthias emerged victorious in the battle because he repelled Moldavian forces.
The Romanian historian who created this YouTube video asserts that this battle was a Hungarian tactical victory but a strategic victory for Stephen, given that Matthias’ campaign ultimately proved unsuccessful. However, if we apply this same logic, can we conclude that the Battle of Cannae (one of the most significant defeats in Roman history) was a Roman strategic victory, given that Hannibal’s campaign against Rome was unsuccessful and ultimately resulted in the fall of Carthage? And not forget, in 1469, Stephen took an oath of allegiance to Mátyás.
In my opinion, every battle should be taken on its own, and not in the context of the whole campaign or war. And if we look at the Battle of Moldvabánya, that was unequivocally a Hungarian victory.
(Source: Kovács Péter)
2 The second interpretation:
Baia/Moldvabánya was the culmination of a campaign rather than a pointed invasion. The battlefield was the entire territory of the Principality of Moldavia. In the end, the battlefield was in Stephen’s hands. His next year’s campaign in the Szekely lands, which ended with the elimination of the Hungarians hosted and supported by Petru Aron (former ruler, uncle, and murderer of his father), is in support of his hard-won victory.
The key to the conflict was, in fact, Stephen’s policy of removing Hungarian suzerainty due to Mathias’ support for Pentru Aron. As Petru Aron was eliminated, in my opinion with Mathias’ blessing, the good terms could have been reinstated and led to the 1469 agreement after which Stephen recognized Matthias as his sovereign. The Hungarian support against the Ottomans (e.g. 5000 Székelys and 2000 Hungarians as frontline at Vaslui in 1475) was due to this. In the long run, strategically speaking, it was a win-win situation.
(Source: Alexandru Silviu Georgescu )
